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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM II)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 945 (1994) of 29 September 1994, in which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) until 31 October 1994, and requested me to ensure that the Council was kept informed of the progress of the talks in Lusaka, as well as on the military and humanitarian situation in Angola. The Council also requested me to submit a report to it by 20 October 1994.

2. During the reporting period, members of the Security Council have been briefed in informal consultations about developments in the country, including by former Under-Secretary-General James O. C. Jonah. It will be recalled that in early September 1994, I asked Mr. Jonah to undertake a mission to Angola to assess the current state of the United Nations efforts in the areas of peacemaking, peace-keeping and humanitarian activities. The mission included staff members from the Departments of Political Affairs, Peace-keeping Operations and Humanitarian Affairs. While in Angola, it met with President José Eduardo dos Santos and a number of senior Government officials. It visited UNAVEM II outstations at Benguela, Lubango and Namibe and one of the cities most affected by the war, the provincial capital of Malange. The mission was not able to travel to Huambo since it did not obtain the necessary security clearance from the Government. In Lusaka, the mission reviewed with my Special Representative the progress of the peace talks and was briefed, at separate meetings, by the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America).

3. The present report reflects the situation as of 20 October 1994 and includes the relevant findings of Mr. Jonah's mission.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

4. In its resolution 945 (1994), the Security Council urged the Government and the União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) to complete the negotiations in Lusaka as soon as possible and to make every effort to sign an

agreement before 31 October 1994. The Council also declared that it would not accept further obstruction or procrastination in the peace process and reiterated its intention to review the role of the United Nations in Angola at any time in the event that a peace agreement was not reached in Lusaka.

5. Since my last report to the Security Council of 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1069), the participants in the peace talks in Lusaka have considered the last item on their agenda, namely, the future mandate of the United Nations and the role of the observer States, including the new mechanism for implementing the "Acordos de Paz" and the forthcoming Lusaka Protocol. In addition, some outstanding issues relating to the question of national reconciliation were also considered.

6. On 16 September 1994, all 60 articles of the section relating to the United Nations mandate were approved by both delegations. The following day, agreement was reached on the five articles of the section dealing with the role of the observers.

7. On 19 September 1994, discussions began on the third and final section of the last item on the agenda, namely, the new mechanism for implementing the "Acordos de Paz" and the Lusaka Protocol. On 21 September, the 13 articles relating to the composition of this new body as well as its functions and operation were approved and on 17 October, both delegations agreed on its name, "The Joint Commission". On 30 September, the 13 articles of the annex containing the definitions and explanations of key military words used in the document on the new United Nations mandate were approved.

8. It will be recalled that on 5 September 1994 UNITA had accepted the package of proposals put forward by my Special Representative and the observer States pertaining to the agenda item on national reconciliation (see S/1994/1069, para. 6). This item was finally concluded on 14 October 1994, when agreement was reached on the list of localities to be administered by members of UNITA, namely, 30 administrators and 35 deputy administrators of municipalities, and 75 administrators of communes.

9. Upon the successful completion of the talks, including agreement on the timetable for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol which has yet to be agreed, the following sequence of events is expected to take place:

D-Day - the initialling of the agreement. On that occasion, it is envisaged that President José Eduardo dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi would each issue a public statement acknowledging the event;

D+2 - a meeting would be convened in Lusaka of high-ranking military representatives of the Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA) and of UNITA to agree on the technical modalities for the re-establishment of the cease-fire;

D+15 - signing ceremony of the Lusaka Protocol by President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi in Lusaka;

D+17 - the cease-fire would come formally into effect.

10. My Special Representative, supported by the representatives of the observer States, has on numerous occasions urged the Government and UNITA to refrain from conducting offensive military operations which not only continue to destroy human lives and property but also threaten the successful conclusion of the Lusaka peace talks. Regrettably, their admonitions have been heeded only to a limited extent, especially in recent days.

III. MILITARY SITUATION

11. Since my last report, there has been some reduction in the intensity of military operations following major military actions conducted by FAA in the northern parts of the country. UNITA reportedly attempted to counter FAA operations by carrying out mostly small-scale raids and attacks, particularly in the Lunda Norte, Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Benguela and Huila provinces. Both forces continued to re-supply and redeploy troops and to reinforce their respective positions, mainly in the provinces of Lunda Norte, Kwanza Sul and Benguela. In recent days, however, both sides have been accusing each other of new military offensives, in particular in the northern and central parts of the country.

12. In the northern provinces, forces of UNITA and the Frente de Libertaçao do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC), as well as the Forças Armadas de Cabinda (FAC), continued guerrilla-type activities in Cabinda. Recently, there were reports of renewed operations around Soyo and Ambriz. UNITA also reportedly concentrated its troops in Lunda Norte province to launch attacks on FAA positions in Dundo, Lucapa and Nzaji. Several offensive actions by UNITA forces near the diamond-rich area of Cafunfo were repelled by Government troops. On 19 September, in Lunda Sul province, UNITA reportedly ambushed a civilian convoy travelling along the Saurimo-Lucapa road and destroyed all of its 20 vehicles. Owing to the intensification of hostilities, the city of Saurimo remained under curfew. In Kwanza Norte, fighting was reported around the provincial capital of N'Dalatando. In the meantime, FAA troops were reported to have intensified military operations against UNITA in Bengo and Kwanza Norte provinces.

13. In the central provinces of Kwanza Sul and Benguela, UNITA was reported to have concentrated its troops near Quilenda, Quibala and Cassegue with the intention of attacking the towns of Gabela and Ganda. It continued guerrilla activities along the Porto Amboim-Luanda road. FAA conducted some offensive action. The Government Air Force reportedly bombed Quibala on 19 September 1994, and on 25 September 1994 FAA regained control over the municipality of Catengue. In Bie province, the situation in Kuito remained relatively calm and the Government forces reportedly enlarged the security belt around the city to a radius of approximately 40 kilometres.

14. In the southern provinces, the military situation remained relatively calm. However, attacks on the provincial capital of Menongue and ambush operations in the region persisted. This aggravated the already precarious situation along the border between Angola and Namibia.

15. In the view of Mr. Jonah's mission, the Government seems to have cut off a significant part of UNITA's source of income and to be able to interdict its

supply routes by capturing most of the diamond areas. UNITA's failure to achieve its objectives in the northern provinces suggests that it is mainly interested in retaining the areas under its control. The recent increase of guerrilla activities in Kwanza Sul province accompanied by a build-up in Quibala might have a threefold aim: to gain a strategic exit to the sea coast, to tie down FAA troops, and to maintain UNITA's presence in densely populated areas. UNITA's apparent strategy of drawing FAA troops from the north by conducting small-scale assaults in the south has on the whole been ineffective. Until the past few days, both sides appeared to have adopted a tactical pause, conducting minor and medium-scale military operations to maintain pressure on each other and reorganizing themselves for launching major offensives should there be no positive outcome from the Lusaka peace talks.

16. Mr. Jonah's mission found the concept of operations envisaged in the contingency planning for an expanded United Nations presence in Angola generally compatible with the principles and modalities which have so far been agreed upon at Lusaka. Broadly speaking, the operational plan would be carried out in the following three phases: in the first phase, disengagement would take place in all areas of contact between the Government and UNITA forces, and the United Nations would deploy military and police observers for the monitoring and verification of the cease-fire; during the second phase, United Nations peace-keeping troops would monitor and verify the cease-fire, the UNITA troops in the quartering areas, the collection and storage of arms and ammunition, the demobilization process, the formation of FAA, and the reintegration of the police; and the third and final phase would focus on the consolidation of national reconciliation activities and on the completion of the electoral process.

IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

17. Military operations have continued to impede the efforts of the international community to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of the affected population. Waves of displaced persons continue to arrive in the towns of Malange, Saurimo, Kuito, Cubal and Ganda in search of relative security. The general concentration of these populations is aggravating the deteriorating situation in those locations, while other areas remain totally inaccessible and have not received any kind of humanitarian assistance over the past two years. There has been a substantial increase in outbreaks of communicable diseases, mainly measles, the control of which requires major coordinated efforts by several agencies and organizations of the United Nations system.

18. The joint efforts of United Nations and non-governmental humanitarian agencies to distribute seeds and tools in time for the next agricultural campaign will, in certain areas, be jeopardized by the movement of persons fleeing from regions of conflict. This constant insecurity in rural areas prevents many families from achieving self-sufficiency in the near future.

19. Citing military considerations, UNITA continued to deny clearance for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Kuito by the United Nations during most of the reporting period. However, following a mission to Huambo on 14 October 1994 led by the Director of the United Nations Humanitarian

Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH), UNITA authorized the United Nations to resume flights to Kuito. With regard to Huambo, after a short period of restriction, the Government proceeded to grant clearance to some humanitarian flights. This has enabled humanitarian organizations to pre-position seeds and tools for the next agricultural campaign, as well as relief stocks. However, deliveries were again interrupted briefly during the second week of October.

20. Mr. Jonah's mission reported that the heavy mining of roads and the precarious security situation had left relief activities in Angola almost completely dependent on the airlift of supplies, equipment and personnel. The relative success of the humanitarian assistance programme has therefore been directly linked to the receipt by the United Nations of clearance for relief flights from the Government and UNITA. In this connection, the mission expressed its concern that flight clearances were sometimes denied to cities such as Huambo, Kuito and Malange where the humanitarian situation is desperate.

21. Coordination of relief assistance by the many United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and bilateral donors active in Angola is undertaken by UCAH. While there was unanimous praise for the performance of UCAH, the precise nature of the operational links between this unit and UNAVEM II was not clear. Mr. Jonah's mission felt that such links would have to be clarified in the future, in the context of an expanded role for the United Nations in Angola.

22. As regards demining, initial peace-keeping priorities would be to ensure clearance of the routes required to deploy the United Nations observers and troops as well as the areas designated for the quartering of the UNITA forces. The humanitarian objectives of demining were seen by Mr. Jonah's mission as being much broader and longer term, to be formulated in the context of a mine action programme which would include a national mines awareness campaign and the training of Angolan mine clearers so as to encourage the establishment of a national mine-clearing capability. As a first step, a national mines awareness campaign was launched on 27 September 1994, through the mass media.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

23. The General Assembly, by its resolution 48/241 of 5 April 1994, provided financial resources for the maintenance of UNAVEM II through the period ending 30 September 1994 at the monthly rate of US$ 2,098,700 gross (US$ 1,997,000 net). Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the current mandate of the mission or entrust a new mandate to the mission in accordance with the recommendation in paragraph 29 of the present report, I shall request the General Assembly at its current session to make adequate financial provisions for the extension.

24. It should be noted, however, that the cash flow situation of the special account of UNAVEM II remains precarious. As of 7 October 1994, outstanding assessed contributions to the account amounted to some US$ 14.1 million. Consequently, in order to provide UNAVEM II with the necessary cash flow, a total of US$ 19 million has been borrowed from the Peace-keeping Reserve Fund for a period exceeding 10 months. This loan remains unpaid.

25. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations as of 7 October 1994 totalled US$ 1.4 billion.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

26. In my annual report on the work of the Organization, dated 2 September 1994, I stated that compromise, tolerance and national reconciliation were the essential elements of a peaceful transition in Angola, and that the comprehensive agreement which is being negotiated in Lusaka should take into account the legitimate rights and aspirations of all Angolans (A/49/1, para. 460). The flexibility displayed recently by both the Government and UNITA, coupled with the Security Council's determination, have been important factors in moving the peace process forward.

27. Mr. Jonah's mission observed that the negotiations in Lusaka were close to a successful conclusion and that an agreement could be initialled within weeks. It expressed the opinion that subsequent talks between high-ranking military representatives of the two sides should not delay the formal signing of the Lusaka Protocol and the re-establishment of the cease-fire throughout the country, though important issues had been left to be agreed at that time. These include the exchange of information relating to the organization, strength and precise location of the Government and UNITA forces, the establishment of monitoring and verification mechanisms and the details of the demobilization process.

28. The mission also reported that the approach followed by my Special Representative in the negotiating process seemed appropriate. He had not only involved the three observer States at all times but had also sought the contribution of the countries of the subregion which have close links to the situation in Angola. The format used in the talks seemed to be particularly helpful. The general and specific principles of each agenda item were examined first and then the modalities for their implementation were considered. Informal consultations and face-to-face meetings between the two delegations were encouraged and this had a positive impact on the resolution of some difficult and delicate issues.

29. As a result of the progress achieved in Lusaka since early September 1994, the peace talks are now in their final phase. If the two sides show the necessary political will, the outstanding issues can be resolved within a very short time. I therefore strongly urge the Government of Angola and UNITA to make every effort to conclude the peace talks by 31 October 1994 and to ensure that the subsequent military talks produce the earliest possible agreement on the important military questions that remain to be decided. In the expectation that an agreement will be concluded by 31 October, I recommend that the current mandate of UNAVEM II be extended until 30 November 1994.

30. In the meantime, I reiterate my appeal to both the Government and UNITA to exercise the utmost restraint and to desist from all military operations which could undermine the progress achieved in Lusaka. The conflict has already exacted a tragic toll throughout the country in terms of loss of human life and

material destruction and it is imperative that all offensive military actions be brought to a halt.

31. The consolidation of peace in Angola will require urgent action on the part of the international community to ensure that a cease-fire is rapidly established and effectively observed. The Security Council may thus wish to consider taking a decision now to authorize the restoration of UNAVEM II's strength to its previous level so as to enable the mission to consolidate implementation of the peace agreement in its initial and most critical stages.

32. The consolidation of peace will also require the continuing support of the international community for humanitarian assistance programmes, many components of which will be directly related to implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. The focus of the humanitarian effort must eventually shift from emergency relief assistance to support of the agreements to be reached in Lusaka, as well as to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. At present, relief supplies cannot be delivered to many parts of the country because aid workers are exposed to physical danger, including land-mines, or run the risk of being kidnapped. It is therefore of paramount importance that the two sides, in particular UNITA, scrupulously respect the neutrality of humanitarian personnel and cooperate fully with the United Nations in determining the whereabouts of those relief workers who have been missing since August 1994.

33. I express, once again, my gratitude to the Heads of State of the subregion for the valuable contribution they have made to the search for peace in Angola. I also thank the representatives of the three observer States for their continued close cooperation and support, which have contributed so much to the advancement of the peace process.

34. Finally, I pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, to the Chief Military Observer, Major-General Chris Garuba, and to the entire staff of UNAVEM II for the dedication with which they continue to discharge their duties. I also express my appreciation to the staff of UCAH and other United Nations humanitarian agencies and the non-governmental organizations for the perseverance with which they provide desperately needed humanitarian relief to the people of Angola under difficult and often dangerous conditions.